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STATEMENT OP ISSUES: 
1. Does This Court Have Jurisdiction to Hear This Matter 
Where There Is A Counterclaim Not Resolved and There Has Been No 
Rule 54(b) Certification? 
2. Should the Liability Reform Act of 1986 Be Applied 
Retroactively to Causes of Action Arising Prior to Enactment? 
3. Does Jacobson Construction supply the correct doctrine 
with regard to Assumption of the Risk in a Case Arising in a 
Roller Rink? 
4. Did the Trial Court Error in Failing to Give Certain 
Jury Instructions Regarding the Applicable Duty of Care? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OP THE CASE; 
This tort action was filed against Classic Roller Skating 
Rink claiming that the Joint Negligence of Classic and an 
unidentified John Doe combined to cause injuries to plaintiff. 
Subsequent to the action being filed and before the case went to 
trial, the Utah State Legislature passed the Liability Reform 
act of 1986. Defendant claimed that the Act should apply to 
this action, that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury, and that 
John Does conduct constituted assault and battery upon 
plaintiff. At issue in this appeal are questions of 
retroactivity of the Liability Reform Act, Assumption of the 
Risk by Plaintiff, and whether John DoeTs conduct constituted an 
intentional assault and Battery on plaintiff, absolving Classic 
of Liability. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Plaintiff herein filed a complaint against defendants Brent 
Henderson dba, Classic Skating Center and John Doe, claiming 
that plaintiff Stevens was injured when struck from behind by 
defendant John Doe who negligently or intentionally caused her 
to fall to the ground, and that Classic was negligent in failing 
to supervise the patrons of their establishment, in failing to 
supervise their employees, and by the the acts and omissions of 
their employees in failing to supervise defendant's customers. 
Record on Appeal pp. 1 through 4 (Attached hereto as exhibit 1). 
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Defendant Classic filed an Answer and Counterclaim, denying 
negligence in its part, claiming comparative and contributory 
negligence, and assumption of the risk by plaintiff. Defend-
ant's counterclaim was brought on the basis that the action was 
prosecuted in bad faith, without merit, and in violation of §78-
27-56 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). Record on Appeal at pp. 
8 through 11 (Attached hereto as exhibit 2) . 
The action was tried to a jury and on July 29, 1986, the 
jury entered a verdict on special interrogatories, determining 
that Classic was negligent and a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injury, that John Doe was negligent and a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injury, and that plaintiff Stevens was not negligent 
and not a proximate cause of her injury, upon which special 
interrogatories the Court entered Judgment. Record on Appeal at 
283, 284. (Addendum of Plaintiff's Brief at A-l through A-6). 
Classic's counterclaim was neither submitted to the Jury nor 
otherwise resolved. 
Defendant Classic accepted that plaintiff Stevens was a 
business invitee of Classic, and as such Classic had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to protect plaintiff. Record on Appeal 
at 61 (Trial Brief of Classic, p.2). Also, Classic agreed and 
consented to weighing the negligence of John Doe, a joint tort 
feasor, and not a party to this action. Record on Appeal at 63 
(Trial Brief of Classic, p.3). 
With regard to the issue of Assumption of the Risk, 
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Classic's manager testified that they average 1,800 people per 
week and average 1 broken bone per month. Record on Appeal at 
441. Classic's expert witness, LaMar Hunt, who has managed this 
rink and currently manages Classic in Sandy, testified that in 
his rinks he will see a broken bone type injury "maybe once 
every six months..." Record on Appeal at 461, lines 4-8. 
Classic's counsel argued Assumption of the Risk to the Jury 
as Comparative Negligence. Record on Appeal at 471 lines 15-24. 
(attached hereto as exhibit 3) • Classic further argued to the 
Jury that the doctrine of Joint and Several Liability would 
apply and that if Joan Stevens was found less than 50% negligent 
"Classic will pay 100% of this judgment." Record on Appeal at 
480 line 11, through 482 line 19. (Attached hereto as exhibit 
4). 
Plaintiff Joan Stevens concurs in the Pacts of the Case as 
presented by defendant Classic. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Classic does not have a final judgment resolving all 
issues in the case nor certification pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
2. The Liability Reform Act of 1986, should not be 
applied to this case, first, because it should not be applied 
retroactively, and second, in light of arguments to the Jury 
failure to apply would be harmless error. 
3. The trial Court properly followed and applied the 
doctrine of Assumption of the Risk to this case. 
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4. The conduct of John Doe did not constitute an 
Intentional Assault and the duty owed by Classic differed from 
the duty owed by defendants in Gustaveson, infra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS IS NOT A PINAL JUDGMENT PROM WHICH 
APPEAL LIES PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b) 
In this action, Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim 
subsequent to being served with a Summons and Complaint in this 
matter. A copy of said Answer and Counterclaim is included as 
an exhibit in the appendix to this Brief and labelled Exhibit 2. 
The matters contained in the Counterclaim were not submitted to 
the jury, and no Order has been entered with regards to the 
Counterclaim in this action. 
Defendants have not availed themselves of the procedures of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), which permits an appeal of 
"fewer than all the claims or parties," but only after District 
Court certification. Defendant has neither sought nor received 
an interlocutory appeal, under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
72(b), as superseded by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5. 
It is well-established law in this jurisdiction that a 
party to a suit generally is entitled to only one appeal as a 
matter of right, regardless of the number of parties or issues 
presented for disposition. An appeal can be taken only from the 
entry of a judgment that finally concludes the action. Pate v. 
Marathon Steel, 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). There is no doubt 
that the entry of judgment by the jury in this case, and the 
subsequent entry of judgment by the Court, constitutes a final 
judgment on the issues presented in Plaintifffs Complaint. 
However, the District Court did not certify the matter for 
appeal under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by 
entering the express finding that there was "no just reason for 
delay." Until a final Order is entered, or until a Rule 54(b) 
certification by the trial Court is obtained, Defendants have 
not appealed from a final, appealable Order. General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation v. Martinez, 24 UAR 18 (Utah 1985), 
quoting Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., supra. 
Requirement of having appeal lie only from an Order 
resolving all issues as to all parties, or having Rule 54(b) 
certification, is jurisdictional. That is, the Appellate Court 
obtains no jurisdiction to hear the matter, even though the 
parties may acquiesce or consent to the appeal. Lack of 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the 
Court. Olsen v. Salt Lake City School District, 39 UAR 39 (Utah 
1986). 
A final point should be noted, that being that plaintiff 
feels that the Counterclaim was groundless, as based upon the 
jurys1 verdict, and has no objection to this matter being heard 
on its merits. Entry of a verdict by the Jury in favor of the 
plaintiff and against defendant Classic establishes that the 
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action was not groundless and brought in bad faith. 
POINT II 
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT OP 1986 SHOULD NOT 
BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT 
Defendant claims only two possible errors in the trial 
court's failure to apply the Liability Reform Act of 1986. 
Defendant provides first that the Court could have applied the 
Act prospectively, and second that the Act effected a procedural 
and not a substantive change in law. 
A. Retroactive v. Prospective Application: Defendants1 
position that the Liability Reform Act may be applied 
prospectively, without having retroactive effect is wholely 
without merit and support. 
First it should be noted that substantial research by this 
office has failed to uncover any Utah decisions directly 
addressing the issue of whether joint and several liability, 
either its creation or elimination, affects substantive rights 
or is merely a procedural remedial law. Section 68-3-3 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended) specifically states that "no part of 
these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." 
The Liability reform Act of 1986, repeals and reenacts the 
Utah Code provisions regarding comparative negligence and right 
to contribution among joint tortfeasors. The changes are 
sweeping and directly effect a Plaintiff's right to recover from 
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Joint tortfeasors as well as abolishing the right of contrib-
ution among joint tortfeasors. 
Unless this Court wishes to address the Liability Reform 
Act piecemeal, it must address the provisions relating to 
Contribution. In addition, an analogy may be drawn to the law 
of Contribution for the proposition that the right to Joint and 
Several Liability effects substantive rights, and therefore, can 
not have retroactive application. 
The Utah Court has held that the creation of a right to 
contribution effects substantive rights. Brunyer v. Salt Lake 
Co. , 551 P.2d 521 522 (Utah 1976). As the Utah Liability Reform 
Act modifies substantive rights, it cannot be applied retro-
actively. 
The doctrine of Joint and Several liability are substan-
tive, pursuant to the definitions provided by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Substantive law is law which creates, defines, 
and regulates the rights and duties of the parties, 
[and not merely] law which pertains to and prescribes 
the practice and procedure by which the substantive 
law is determined or made effective. 
Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, at 593-4 (Utah 1948). 
Applying the definitions in Petty to the Utah statute on 
joint and several liability, it is clear that the joint and 
several liability and contribution statutes define the rights of 
the plaintiff and the duties of the joint tortfeasors. The 
plaintiff had the right to recover from one or more of the joint 
tortfeasors, and each joint tortfeasor had the duty to pay the 
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entire damage when this cause of action arose. If the Utah 
Liability Reform Act is applied as requested by defendant, it 
would modify existing rights, and would be, in effect, 
retroactive. 
Defendants baldly assert in their Memorandum that Plaintiff 
had no vested right at the time the Liability Reform Act took 
effect. Defendant cites no authority for this statement. 
Some guidance in this matter may be obtained from the case 
of United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Park City Co., 
397 F.Supp. 411 (D. Ore. 1973), in which the Court examined a 
contribution joint tortfeasor statute to determine whether it 
should be applied retroactively to an accident that occurred 
prior to the effective date of that statute. In reaching its 
decision, the Federal District Court noted the general rule 
against retroactive application absent an express provision of 
retroactivity. The Court stated: 
"The relationship between the parties is fixed as 
of the date of the action. It is at that time that 
these parties become joint tort-feasors. Their rights 
and obligations. . .are governed by the then existing 
substantive law. . .ff 
Id. at 414 
Similarly, in a case dealing with the amount recoverable 
under a WorkmensT Compensation Statute, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that "Civil liabilities already incurred may not be 
changed by statute unless specifically so provided by the 
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Legislature." 8000 West Corp. v. Stewart, 546 P.2d 1281, 1282 
(Utah 1976). 
Other cases dealing with application of substantive law are 
in accord: 
The distinction (between purely procedural and 
purely substantive legislation) relates not so much to 
the form of the statute as to its effects. If 
substantial changes are made, even in a statute which 
might ordinarily be classified as procedural, the 
operation on existing rights would be retroactive 
because the legal effects of past events would be 
changed, and the statute will be construed to operate 
only in futuro unless the legislative intent to the 
contrary clearly appears. 
Aetna Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 30 Cal.2d 
388, 182 P.2d 159, 162 (1947) (emphasis added). 
It thus appears clear from Utah precedent in the areas of 
contribution from joint tortfeasors and of insurance coverage 
that the Act effects substantive rights of the parties and the 
provisions of §68-3-3, rather than its exception, should be 
applied to deny the Act retroactive effect. 
B. Legislative Intent as to Application of the Liability 
Reform Act. 
The Liablility Reform Act contains no express language as 
to whether the Act is to apply to causes of action pending at 
the Actfs effective date. Courts generally apply a rule of 
strict construction against retroactive application of statutes, 
unless there is an express text declaring otherwise. See 
generally, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §41.0^, 4th Ed., 
1973: 
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The strength and continued vitality of the rule 
favoring exclusively prospective interpretation is 
often espoused. Words in a statute ought not to have 
retroactive operation unless they are so clear, strong 
and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to 
them, or unless the intent of the legislature cannot 
otherwise be satisfied. 
This rule has been codified in Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 
(supra). In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 
Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958), the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of §68-3-3: 
As to any statutory question, Utah's policy 
demands the inclusion of an express authorization to 
justify any retrospective application of the statute. 
Id. at 399. 
In the absence of express statutory language, courts often 
look to the statute's legislative history to determine if the 
statute was intended to apply retroactively or prospectively. 
During the 1986 general session of the Utah legislature in a 
state and local standing commmittee meeting on January 27, 1986, 
statements were made which shed light on the ligislature's 
intention. Senator Williams pointedly asked Senator Barlow, the 
Act's principal sponsor: 
Do you foresee any problems with this law coming 
into effect immediately. . .in terms of cases coming 
on line right now or within the next six months? 
Senator Barlow referred the question to Al Larson, the bill's 
pricipal draftsman, who answered: 
We perceive that this Act will govern only causes 
of action or claims which arise after the Act's 
effective date. 
Moments later, Senator Williams again questioned Senator 
Barlow and Mr. Larson: 
So it really does not matter what the effective 
date is? 
(This question Implied that whether the Act became effective 
upon the Governor's siganture or 60 days post adjournment was of 
no great importance since the relative impact on pending cases 
would be the same.) In response, Senator Barlow put forth the 
following example: 
"Say you had a serious accident happen the day 
after the Governor signed the Liability Reform Act. 
It is now the law. Otherwise, the accident would go 
under the provisions of the old law. 
Utah Senate State and Local Standing Committe Tapes, 1986 
General Sess., Utah State Legislature, January 27, 1986. 
This series of questions and answers indicate that the 
bill's principal sponsor believed that causes of action accruing 
prior to the Actys effective date would be governed by existing 
law and not the Liability Reform Act. The committee passed the 
proposed amendment by a unanimous vote immediately following 
this discussion. 
On the floor of the Utah House of Representives during 
debate on the final reading of the Act, Representative Adams 
asked a similar question: 
"How does this Act effect lawsuits that are presently being 
filed or that have been recently settled?" 
Representative Demann responded: "It has no bearing on 
existing cases, it will affect only those accidents that occur 
after the law has gone into effect." Utah House of 
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Representatives Floor Records, Utah State Legislature, 1986 
General Sess., Pubruary 26, 1986, Record No. 18. Within ten 
(10) minutes of this statement, the House approved the Act by a 
vote of 50 to 13. (Memorandum Decision, Fashon Place 
Investment, et al. v. Salt Lake County, et al., Consolidated 
Case No. C-84-302, Third District Court for Salt Lake County) 
Thus, a review of the legislative history of the Liability 
Reform Act indicates that the Legislature intended that it not 
apply to pending cases. 
C. Cases Cited by the Defendant are not Applicable 
The cases cited by Defendants Classic and Henderson, in 
support of their position that the Liability Reform Act of 1986 
may be applied prospectively are not authoritative or applicable 
to this action. Defendant cites dicta from the case of Silver 
King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission in 2 Utah 2d 
1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954), for the proposition that Plaintiff did 
not have a right. 
The case is not on point. That case sought a determination 
regarding the Statute of Limitations on a death benefit statute. 
The case was unique to Workers' Compensation Law, involved 
numerous contingencies affecting liability, and ultimately the 
Court held that the amendment to the law was enacted before the 
worker's claim was barred and hence, before his decedent's 
rights were barred. The cause of action of his dependants had 
not yet arisen, and therefore the statute was not being applied 
retroactively. Id. at 693. 
Likewise, the Defendants1 argument that the case of 
Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979) provides support 
for the proposition that this statute may be applied 
prospectively is unjustly and incompletely made. The case is 
inapplicable in deciding whether the Liability Reform Act should 
be given retroactive effect and applied to pending cases. 
Indeed, the Court specifically noted rT[w]e do not view the 
statute as operating retroactively." Id. at 1042, The quote 
looked at the language of the statute, which explicitly directed 
that all judgments entered after the Actfs effective date must 
include interest on the amount awarded. They were also careful 
to point out that the change did not affect judgments entered 
prior to its effective date. Thus, since the Court did not even 
consider this statute to be retroactive in effect, the holding 
in Campbell has no bearing on the issue now before this Court. 
In addition, the Supreme Court specifically held in Campbell: 
Similarly, we believe the legislative intent 
regarding this statute to be that the date of the act 
giving rise to the action is in all cases the date 
used for computing the period of interest. 
Pursuant to the legislative analysis provided above, it is 
clear that the legislative intent in the Liability Reform Act of 
1986 was that it not apply to cases that arose prior to the 
Actfs effective date. 
D. Substantive Law vs. Procedural Law Approach: 
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It has often been recognized, as set forth above, that an 
act may be given retroactive effect if it is procedural and not 
substantive in character. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
this narrow exception to the general rule of non-retroactivity: 
Tf[w]here an amendment's effect was "procedural" 
or "remedial." Foil v. Ballinger, Utah, 601 P.2d 144 
(1979) (clarified statutory notice provision and 
changed "commenced" to "initiated"); Petty v. Clark, 
113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (194B1 (added n?w 
categories or suits where jury is advisory); Boucofski 
v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909) (empowered 
courts to make additional findings after entry of 
judgment). In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d at 151, we 
quoted with approval a passage from Okland 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, Uta.ti] 520 
P.2d 208, 210-11 (1974), which stated that a statute 
or amendment may be retroactively applied where it 
"deals only with clarTfication or amplification as to 
how the law should have been understood prior to its 
enactment " 
In Re J.P., 5T8 P.2d 1364, 1369-1370, fn. 4 (Utah 1982) 
(emphasis added). 
In the case cited, the Court went on to hold that 
amendments concerning when parental rights may be involuntarily 
terminated in a child's best interests were not a merely 
procedural change or clarification, even though the statute's 
controlling principle was not altered. The amendments could not 
be applied retroactively since "changes of this magnitude do not 
fit within the relatively narrow exception" to the general rule. 
In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1370, fn. 4. Accord, In the Matter of 
Disconnection of Certain Territory From Highland City, 668 P.2d 
544, 548-549 (Utah 1983) (where amendments do not merely 
"clarify" or "amplify" how the earlier law should have been 
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understood, but alter the substantive criteria for decision, 
they constitute a fundamental change in the law on which both 
sides have relied in preparing and presenting their cases and 
cannot be given retroactive effect). 
Shortly after the 1973 enactment of §78-27-37, et seq. the 
Utah Supreme Court had occasion to examine whether or not the 
right of contribution among joint tortfeasors (§78-27-39, U.C.A. 
1953 as amended 1973) was a substantive right or whether the 
statute was "remedial" or "procedural" in nature. The Court 
concluded: 
[t]he statute above mentioned [§78-27-39] does in 
fact create a right of action where none existed prior 
to its adoption. A right of action should be 
distinguished from remedies. One precedes and gives 
rise to the other, but they are separate and distinct. 
The contribution statute established a primary right 
and duty which was not in existence at the time the 
injuries in this case arose, and the statute not being 
retroactive by its terms did not create a right on 
behalf of the third party plaintiffs. 
Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, 551 P2d 521, 522 (Utah 1976) (fn. 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Other Courts are in agreement with that holding. 
[t]he distinction [between purely procedural and 
purely substantive legislation] relates not so much to 
the form of the statute as to its effects. If 
substantial changes are made, even in a statute which 
might ordinarily be classified as procedural, the 
operation on existing rights would be retroactive 
because the legal effects of past events would be 
changed, and the statute will be construed to operate 
only in futuro unless the legislative intent to the 
contrary clearly appears. 
Aetna Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 
30 Cal.2d 38«, 182 P72d 1591 152 (19W (emphasis 
added). 
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Should this Court determine that the legislative history is 
not dispositive of the issues, it must be determined whether the 
act modifies substantive rights. In that regard, defendant 
Classic has addressed the issues backwards. It should be here 
noted that the issues of Procedural vs. Substantive rights 
analysis are intermingled with the issues addressed in Point II-
A of this brief. 
The issues in this case can be distinguished from the issue 
before the Iowa Supreme Court in Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 
372 N.W. 2d 486 (Iowa 1985). In Baldwin, the Court analyzed a 
statute limiting joint and several liability which expressly 
stated that it was to be applied retroactively. The issue for 
the Iowa Supreme Court was whether the statute by its terms 
deprived the plaintiff of a vested right, and thereby violated 
plaintiff's due process rights under the United States Consti-
tution. In this case, the Court is faced with a different 
issue. Although it appears clear that the Legislature intended 
this statute not to apply retroactively, the Courts have used a 
procedural versus substantive analysis to aid in the 
determination of the legislative intent. 
In McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1947), the Utah Supreme Court examined the substantive/ 
procedural distinction in a case dealing with the Idaho 
comparative negligence statute. The court held that an error in 
an instruction concerning the percentage finding on liability 
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would be prejudicial because: "We think the instructions in a 
case like this are of a substantive, not procedural bent." Id, 
at 424. 
The Utah court considered the retroactive application of a 
new statute in Okland Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm., 520 
P.2d 208 (Utah 1974), when a workman's compensation amendment 
resulted in two possible formulas for computing compensation. 
In deciding which statute was applicable, the court stated: 
It is true as the employer Okland contends 
that it is entitled to have its rights 
determined on the basis of the law as it existed 
at the time of the occurrence, and that a later 
statute or amendment should not be applied in a 
retroactive manner to deprive a party of his 
rights or impose greater liability upon him. 
Id. at 210 
The fact that the claim filed January 25th, 1985, had not 
been reduced to a judgment does not weaken the relationship 
that was fixed by the tortious conduct of the defendants. The 
application of Section 68-3-5, Utah Code Ann., to a claim not 
yet reduced to a judgment was approved by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities, 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 
1040 (193D . 
Comparative negligence statutes examined by other courts 
have been found to be substantive in nature. See, Johnson v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977); Dunham v. South 
Side National Bank of Missoula, 548 P.2d 1383 (Mont. 1976). 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Park City Corp., 
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397 F. Supp. 411 (D. Ore. 1973), is similar to this case. In 
that case the court examined a contribution joint tortfeasor 
statute to determine whether it should be applied retroactively 
to an accident that occurred prior to the effective date of the 
statute. In reaching its decision, the Federal District Court 
noted the general rule against retroactive application absent an 
express provision of retroactivity. The court stated: 
The relationship between the parties is fixed as 
of the date of the accident. It is at that time that 
these parties become joint tort-feasors. Their rights 
and obligations as among themselves are governed by 
the then existing substantive law which did not 
provide for contribution among joint tort-feasors. 
Id. at 414. 
The incident on November 8, 1984, fixed the relationship 
between the parties. The Comparative Negligence Act was in 
effect at that time, allowing Plaintiffs to recover their entire 
judgment from any one of the Defendants found liable. The 
Plaintiff could decide against whom to proceed, and could 
consider a Defendant's ability to pay as a primary factor. If 
the Liability Reform Act is applied retroactively, there could 
be instances where Plainitffs who made an economic decision not 
to join certain Defendants would under the new law desire them 
as parties only to find that the Statute of Limitations had run. 
Plaintiffs who relied on the continuation of joint and several 
liability when deciding from which Defendants recovery should be 
sought would be precluded from obtaining a full recovery. 
In Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz. 95, 574 P.2d 1314 (App. 
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1977), the Arizona Appellate Court again recognized the 
exception to retroactivity for "a statute relating solely to 
prcedural law such as as burden of proof and rules of evidence." 
Id, at 1315. However, that Court refused to apply the exception 
in a situtation where the new statute in question changed the 
measure of damages. "A rule effecting the measure of damages is 
a substantive right, . . .and a change in the law effecting the 
measure of an injured person's right of recovery cannot be 
applied retroactively." Id. at 1316. 
This holding is particularly important here because 
application of the Liability Reform Act of 1986 to the present 
case would in fact change the Plaintiff's right of recovery, as 
defendant Classic has requested that its liability on the 
judgment entered against it be reduced, and there is no recovery 
against John Doe. Retroactive application would effect the 
measure of damages. Retroactive application would effect 
substantive rights . 
Finally, there can be no error on the trial court in this 
case, as the guidance provided by the Utah Supreme Court in In 
re: Ingrahams Estate, 148 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1944): 
If by chance a reasonable doubt should exist as 
to whether or not a statute operates in futuro or is 
retroactive, such should be resolved in favor of 
prospective operation. 
Therefore, the trial court in this case properly determined 
that reducing the Plaintifffs verdict pursuant to the Liability 
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Reform Act of 1986 would be a retroactive application of the 
statute and that it would not be procedural, but rather would 
affect substantive rights. 
E. The Retroactive Elimination of Joint and Several Liability 
Would Violate Public Policy in this State 
The Court's rationale, in 8000 West Corp. v. Stewart, 
supra, is particularly appropriate in this case now before the 
Court, since insurance coverage is also involved. 
"To interpret the statute retrospectively, 
could create chaos in the operations of. . .insurers 
whose premium rates and loss reserves are computed on 
their potential liability inherent in the statutory 
scheme that was in effect upon issuance of the 
Insurance. Cf. Taylor y. Public Employees' Retirement 
Association, 542 P.2d 383 (Colorado)." 
8000 West Corp. v. Stewart, 5^ 6 P.2d at 1283 (emphasis added). 
In the pending action, retroactive application of the 
newly-enacted Liability Reform Act of 1986 would result in a 
windfall to the insurance company involved, since their premium 
rates and loss reserves at the time this action arose were based 
on the negligence statutes then in effect. It is not the public 
policy of this State and this Court to bend to special interest 
legislation, such as is involved here, and to modify substantive 
and existing rights, absent some express legislative intent to 
do so. As the above argument establishes, the legislature did 
not so intend. 
Defendant asserts in its brief that Joint and Several 
Liability is a common law doctrine which was codified in Utah at 
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the time plaintiff was injured by defendants negligence. 
Defendant then argues that it is unfair to require defendant to 
pay. Plaintiff here argues that it would be unfair to take from 
her the right to collect for defendant's negligence which right 
existed at the time this incident occurred. 
P. The Jury Award Included a Determination That Defendant 
Henderson dba Classic Pay All Damages, and Therefore, Non-
Retroactive Application of the Liability Reform Act Would Be 
Harmless Error In Any Event: 
Over Plaintiff's counsel objection, Defense counsel argued 
to the jury that Defendant Henderson would be liable for 100 
percent of the damages awarded by the jury. Specifically, he 
educated the jury as follows: 
TfIt!s extremely important that you understand 
what happens with these percentages. 
"If you find Mrs. Stephens was 50 percent or more 
negligent, she collects nothing. . .If you find that 
she's less than 50 percent negligent and you get, you 
can divide the percentages among the other two 
parties, Henderson or this John Doe, the problem that 
we have and as why I'm instructing you on it, that you 
need to be sure when you do, if you give Henderson 
Enterprises any negligence, that you really want them 
to pay. Because the way the law works is called joint 
and several liability, and the way the law works is 
that if Henderson Enterprises has 1 percent negligence 
on this special verdict form, the Plaintiff is allowed 
to collect the percent of thejudgment from any of the 
Defendants. So what does that add up to in this case? 
You write her down 40 percent negligence and you write 
John Doe down 50 percent negligence and give Henderson 
10 percent negligence, Henderson will pay a hundred 
percent of the amount that you award. Because nobody 
knows who John Doe is. And 'till . . . " 
[Plaintiff objects and bench conferance is held] 
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THE COURT: "Your objection is noted, and I will 
overrule it." 
MR. SANDERS: ". . .So the point that you are 
making is, you need to understand if you find her less 
and there's another point that I have to address on 
her, too, but I need to get the basic premise out here 
for you that Henderson Industries, if you give them 
one—is going to pay 100 percent of this Judgment. 
Tf
. . .But the one thing I want you to understand 
is, you donTt find Mrs. Stephens 50 percent or more 
negligent and you give 1 percent to the Hendersons, 
you need to be sure that you want to pay 100 percent 
of the negligence, because that's what's going to 
happen -(unintelligible)- her negligence." 
Transcript of Trial; p. 128 line 9, to p. 130 line 19; Record 
on Appeal at 480-482. 
This argument was improper for several reasons. Mainly, it 
misstated the law in,that it failed to instruct the Jury that 
plaintiff's award would be reduced by her pro-rata share of 
fault. 
The Jury came back with a finding that Plaintiff Joan 
Stephens was 0% negligent. The Jury likewise determined that 25% 
negligence would lie on Defendant Henderson dba Classic. In 
entering a verdict, the Jury was advised and intended that 
Henderson would be liable for the entire amount. 
It should be noted that the Jury found Henderson 
approximately 1/4 at fault. The Jury awarded approximately 1/5 of 
the requested special damages, and approximately 1/6 of the 
requested general damages. 
Therefore, it would be extremely unfair to reduce the award 
against Defendant Henderson dba Classic by their pro-rata share 
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of fault. The jury has already reduced Henderson's verdict by 
approximately his pro-rata share of fault. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ATTEMPTING TO APPLY THE PRIMARY DOCTRINE 
OP ASSUMPTION OP THE RISK 
A. Current Status of Assumption of the Risk Under Utah Law: 
The primary doctrine of assumption of the risk is a 
complete bar to recovery in a negligence action. That is the 
defense as it existed at common law and it was deemed to be part 
of Contributory Negligence. Assumption of the Risk, "in its 
primary sense, it is an alternative expression for the 
proposition that defendant was not negligent, that is, there was 
no duty owed or there was no breach of an existing duty." 
Jacobsen Const, v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 at 310 
(Utah 1980). 
In Jacobsen, this Court examined substantial authorities in 
making its final determination, and quoted favorably from the 
New Jersey court which stated 
"We thought, however, that ![p]erhaps a well-
guarded charge of assumption of risk in its primary 
sense will aid comprehension' (cite ommitted) * * * 
Experience, however, indicates the term 'assumption of 
risk1 is so apt to create mist that it is better 
banished from the scene. We hope we have heard the 
last of it. Henceforth let us stay with "negligence" 
and "contributory negligence." 
Id. at 311. 
The Defendants in this case ask this Court to determine 
that Assumption of the Risk in sporting event cases should be 
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retained In Its primary sense. This argument clearly runs 
contrary to the Utah Statutory Scheme and the purpose of the 
Comparative Negligence Statute as recognized by this Court. 
At the time this incident arose, the Utah Comparative 
negligence statute, §78-27-37, Utah Code Ann. (1973) read: 
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery 
in an action by any person . . .if such negligence was 
not as great as the negligence or gross negligence of 
the person against whom recovery is sought . . .As 
used in this act, "contributory negligence" includes 
"assumption of the risk." 
The inclusion of "assumption of the risk" in the doctrine 
of negligence is retained in the 1986 version of the law which 
defines fault as "any actionable breach of legal duty, act or 
omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or 
damages sustatined by a person seeking recovery, including, . 
. assumption of the risk" §78-27-37(2), Utah Code Ann. (1986) 
The legislative intent to include assumption of 
risk within contributory negligence terminology and 
eliminate the use of the term is consistent with a 
recent trend estabnlished by other courts, 
legislatures, and legal commentators alike. 
Jacobsen, supra, at 309. 
The Jacobsen court recognized Assumption of the Risk in its 
secondary sense, as part of Comparative Negligence. The Court 
held: 
[t]hat under our comparative negligence statute 
"assumption of risk" language is not appropriate to 
describe the various concepts previously dealt with 
under that terminology but is to be treated, in its 
secondary sense, as contributory negligence. 
Specifically, and with particular reference to our 
comparative negligence act, the reasonableness of 
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plaintiff's conduct in confronting a known or unknown 
risk created by defendant's negligence will basically 
be determined under principles of contributory negli-
gence." Attention should be focused on whether a 
reasonable prudent man in the exercise of due care 
would have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge of 
it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself 
in the manner in which the plaintiff acted in light of 
all the surrounding circumstances, including the 
appreciated risk, (cite omitted) Then, if plain-
tiff's unreasonableness is viewed to be less than that 
of defendant, according to the terms of the statute, 
"any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion 
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering" (Pn. omitted). 
Id., at 312 
Therefore, under Utah law, it is clear that the primary 
doctrine of Assumption of Risk Is no longer viable, and the 
trial court in this case, following the guidelines of the Utah 
Supreme Court made the proper legal determinations. 
B. Analysis in light of the facts of this case 
The Defendant claims reversible error of the trial court 
based upon the failure to give requested instructions. A review 
of the requested instructions establishes that none of the 
refused instructions contain the language necessary to comply 
with the existing law. Specifically, none of the requested 
instructions contained any of the essential information 
contained in the last quote, supra, from Jacobsen, which would 
be essential to the jury in making an informed and fair 
determination. 
In addition, it is clear by the argument of Defendants' 
counsel that they were not prejudiced by the determinations of 
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the Court. Defense counsel argued to the jury, without 
objection, that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent based 
upon submitting herself to a known and appreciable risk. His 
argument was as follows: 
"Now, we have used a couple of words, or they 
have, to describe the crowd. One is "rough" and the 
other is "rowdy." . . . Things get pretty rowdy. 
"And so this is the atmosphere in which Mrs. 
Stephens puts herself, when she goes in there, she 
walks in, she's in there a half-hour before she gets 
on that floor, and she sees the crowd, going around, 
and she sees the nature of the crowd. . . . And she 
see's what's going on, she has ample opportunity. And 
I suggest to you, if she had fear for her safety out 
there, she was negligent to get out onto the floor in 
that situation. 
In Thomas v. Studio Amusements, 123 P.2d 552 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 19^2), California recognized quite early that 
assumption of the Risk did not apply to certain circumstances 
that might occur at a roller skaing rink. 
One of respondent corporation's defenses was the 
assumption by appellant of the risks incident to 
skating upon such a rink; but it cannot be argued that 
one of the normal risks involved is the reckless 
action of other skaters capable of being prevented by 
guards who are stationed upon the rink for the 
protection of patrons. While the operator of a 
skating rink is not an insurer of his patrons' safety, 
nevertheless, he owes a duty to protect them from 
risks other than those normally incident to the 
sport." 
Basically, the statement was reiterated by the same appeals 
court and judge in Harston v. Studio Amusements, 195 P.2d 498 
(1948). Therefore, the mere fact that plaintiff was roller 
skating is no basis for finding that she assumed the risk and is 
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not entitled to recover for Classic's negligence as demanded by 
defendant. 
C. Plaintiff's Assumption of the Risk is Negligible and 
Therefore Plaintiff is Absolved of Liability As Jury Found 
By quantifying the assumption of the risk according to 
testimonies delivered by Brad Harmon and Lamar Hunt, both 
involved with Classic Skating Rink, and in consideration of the 
total number of skaters who patronize the Roller Rink on a 
monthly basis, Plaintiff's assumption of the risk is negligible 
and she is, therefore, not subject to comparative fault of even 
1 per cent. 
Mr. Harmon testified that he estimated the number of 
accidents per month at the Roller Rink to be one, while Mr. Hunt 
approximated one accident in six months at the Rinks he has 
managed. Mr. Harmon testified that he averages 1,800 skaters 
per week. Record at 441. 
If the Court considers the vast numbers of patrons who 
skate at the Rink each month, it can be seen that one accident 
in six months, and even one accident in each month, is such a 
small fraction that the individual skater assumes less than 1% 
(less than .000139%) risk of injury per visit to the Rink. 
Having this minute percentage of assumption of the risk renders 
such assumption negligible, in the absence of other aggravating 
factors. This relieves the individual patron (the Plaintiff) of 
fault in such an accident as is before the Court in this case, 
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and justifies the jurys1 verdict finding liability on Classic. 
The question of Assumption of the Risk presents a question for 
the finder of Pact. 
Counsel for Plaintiff Joan Stephens argues that, contrary 
to the Brief filed by Appellant, the jury was not required to 
find that the decision to roller skate by the Plaintiff was 
inherently negligent, which decision Defendant contends "no jury 
is ever likely to (make)." That, in fact, ample opportunity was 
given to the jury to properly assess the comparative fault of 
the parties . 
Jacobsen Const, v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 
(Utah 1980), further explains that even if assumption of the 
risk is a consideration, it cannot be a complete bar to 
recovery in order "to avoid the harshness visited upon 
Plaintiffs as a result of the all-or-nothing nature of the 
former rule of law." This being the intent of the law, 
Defendant Classic's contention that a finding of assumption of 
the risk in Plaintiff must occur to render the results of this 
case fair to him is unfounded, as Plaintiff is the party to whom 
rightfully belongs the Court1s protection from a harsh result. 
In addition, it should be noted that Defendant Classic now 
invites this Court to find that roller skating is inherently 
negligent and that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, even 
though it admits that no jury is likely to ever so find. It 
requests a harsh result upon Plaintiff even after this case has 
been presented to the Jury and Plaintiff Joan Stevens was found 
to be 0% at fault. That is clearly not the current state of the 
Law in Utah with regard to Assumption of the Risk. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE 
APPROPRIATE DUTY OP CARE AND DEPENDANT 
CLASSIC DID NOT REQUEST ANY APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS 
Defendant claims that the Court should have instructed the 
jury based on a theory of the case that plaintiff was 
intentionally assaulted by a patron of the roller rink. In 
support of that theory, defendant relies upon Gustaveson v. 
Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982), for the proposition that the 
duty of a proprietor to guard patrons against intentional 
assaults only arises where "a proprietor must have some cause to 
believe that the particular individual committing the tort would 
so act." 
This argument fails to address the differences between 
Gustaveson and the present case. In Gustaveson, the plaintiff 
was assaulted and battered (slugged in the face) by another 
patron of a bowling alley. In this case, the most serious 
conduct which may be found on John Doe is that he was skating 
around the rink tripping people, which defendant Classic admits 
the floor guards should have seen, and skated up behind 
plaintiff and tripped her. 
A. The Tort in This Case Was Not Intentional: 
First, the nature of the tort is different in the two 
cases. The tort in this case was not intentional, within the 
guidelines provided in Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 
1980). In Matheson, the plaintiff brought an action for damages 
after he was struck with a "tootsie pop" thrown from a second 
floor of a school building. The issue before the Court was 
whether the conduct constituted an intentional assault, for the 
purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations. 
The Utah Court, citing many authorities, held that: f?[I]f 
the act is undertaken without an intent to harm or a substantial 
certainty that harm will result from the act, the actor is not 
guilty of an intentional tort." Id. at 322. The Court went on 
in its analysis, stating that "It is this absence of intent to 
harm which renders reckless misconduct or reckless disregard of 
safety a form of negligence and not an intentional tort.?" 
(fm. omitted, emphasis added). 
There is no showing of intent to harm in this case. Indeed, 
defendant's own witnesses stated that falling down while skating 
was not unusual and that people who fell down usually did not 
get injured. The facts of this case, as provided by defendant 
also establish that John Doe tripped or attempted to trip 
several people as he skated around the rink. As this Court 
found in Matheson: 
"In the present case, the trier of fact could 
find the defendant acted with no intent to harm the 
plaintiff and the[ir] acts did not create a 
substantial certainty of harm from which a harmful 
intent can be imputed. Rather, the fact finder could 
determine the defendants acted in reckless disregard 
for the safety of the plaintiff, which constitutes a 
form of negligence. . ." 
Id. at 323. 
There was no evidence put on that John Doe intended to 
cause harm to the plaintiff herein. The facts were very simply 
that John Doe was causing a hazard to other patrons, in 
violation of rink rules and employee guidelines, and that 
Classic was negligent in failing to control such conduct. 
B. The Duty Owed Differs In This Case and Gustaveson 
Defendant Classic's reliance on Gustaveson is improper in 
the second instance because it fails to take into consideration 
the difference between the intentional assault and battery in 
the bowling alley and the tripping of a patron at a skating 
rink. 
Factually, the court in Gustaveson took into consideration 
that the desk clerk at a bowling alley is responsible for 
renting shoes, handing out score sheets, and otherwise dealing 
with the change of partons getting off and on the lanes. 
However, at a roller rink, the floor guards are charged 
with the duty of supervising the floor activities and seeing 
that no skaters create a danger to others by "fast skating, 
playing tag, tripping, playing crack the whip" and other conduct 
which creates a danger to other skaters. (Defendants trial 
exhibits, attached hereto as exhibits 5 and 6, Transcript of 
trial at 91). In this case the evidence was that the floor 
guards were absent from the rink, and that they were not 
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policing the hazardous activity pursuant to their express 
duties. Record at 359, line 15, to 360, line 10. 
In short, at a skating rink, the floor guards are charged 
with the specific duty to supervise activities and halt 
hazardous skating practices. At a bowling alley, desk clerks 
are only charged with the duty to protect patrons where there is 
"knowledge of previous temper tirades and physical aggression on 
the part of the assailant." Gustaveson, supra at 696. This 
Court further supported its decision in Gustaveson with the 
dicta that: 
"In this case, Gregg gave no forewarning or 
indication that he would strike the plaintiff until 
moments before he did so. He was not the- bowler who 
had exchanged remarks with the plaintiff. He had not 
previouslyassaulted or threatened to assault anyone. 
In fact, he had displayed no tendancy for potentially 
physically abusive behavior prior to his assault on 
the plaintiff." 
Id. at 696. 
Again, in this case, John Doe had given forewarning and 
indication that he would cause a hazard to other skaters. He 
was the skater who had previously tripped other skaters, just 
moments before. John Doe had displayed his tendancy for 
potentially physically abusive behavior, and the floor guards 
had failed to take any action in violation of their own rules 
and guidelines. 
Finally, with regard to defendant Classicfs claim that it 
was prejudiced by the failure to the court to give proper 
instructions on the Duty Owed, it should here be noted that 
defendant did not request any instruction to which it would be 
entitled, and therefore, the Trial Court did not error. The 
instruction based upon Gustaveson v. Gregg was improper because 
this did not constitute an intentional tort, within the 
guidelines set forth in Matheson. At the very most, the conduct 
created a fact question which may have been presented to the 
Jury ("did John Doe intend to cause injury to Joan Stevens?"), 
but, defendant did not request an instruction or Interrogatory 
in the issue of intent. Because of that, defendant failed to 
request an instruction which would "fully inform the jury as to 
the applicable law in order to enable the jury to fully and 
fairly resolve the dispute." Elkington v. Foust, 6l8 P.2d 37 
(Utah 1980) . 
C. An Intentional Act Does Not Cut Off Proximate Cause 
Plaintiff would also contend that the failure of the Court 
to find an Intentional Act does not, by itself, act to absolve 
defendant Classic of Negligence. It was held by the Utah 
Supreme Court that an intentional act (in that case criminal 
conduct of a third person) "[w]ould not preclude a finding of 
proximate cause if the intervening agency was itself a 
forseeable act. 0" Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 
240 at 246. (fn. omitted). 
As the conduct of John Doe was clearly forseeable to 
defendant Classic, as based on their guidelines attached hereto 
as exhibits 5 and 6, and the record cited to above, the mere 
allegation that John Doe's act was intentional would not absolve 
Classic of liability. Again, Classic requested no Jury 
Instruction to which it was entitled. 
CONCLUSION 
Since defendant and appellant Classic has not taken any 
steps to resolve its counterclaim and no order has been entered 
with regard to the Counterclaim, and since defendant has not 
requested nor received Rule 5Mb) certification, there is a 
jurisdictional problem in bringing this appeal. 
However, should the Court wish to address this matter on 
its merits, this Court should address two issues. The Liability 
Reform Act of 1986 abolishes Joint and Several Liability and 
Contribution among joint tort feasors. It is clear from the 
above analysis that the right to collect Jointly and Severally 
from tort feasors was a substantive right, as was the right to 
contribution among joint tort feasors. The Act does not provide 
that it is to apply retroactively, and absent an express 
indication of such intent, Utah Statutory Law and Common Law 
prohibit such retroactive application. The Leglislative intent 
was that it not apply to pending cases. Joint and Several 
Liability and Contribution are not merely procedural/remedial 
law, as it effects damages, it is substantive law which may not 
be enforced retroactively. In any event, the failure to apply 
it retroactively in this case was harmless error in light of the 
instructions to the jury and the argument of Defense Counsel. 
The Trial Court properly ruled on the doctrine of 
Assumption of The Risk in this case. In following the Jacobson 
case, the court determined that Assumption of the Risk was to be 
included in comparative negligence, instructed the Jury on 
Comparative Negligence and Defendant's Counsel argued Assumption 
of the Risk to the Jury as Comparative Negligence. The Jury 
found plaintiff zero percent negligent. Defense counsel 
requested no instructions to which he was entitled. Defendant/ 
appellant admits that no jury is likely to find rollerskating 
inherently negligent, and requests this Court to determine such 
inherent negligence as a matter of law, against authority to the 
contrary. 
Finally, with regard to appellant's argument that the Court 
failed to properly instruct the Jury on the Duty owed, it should 
be again be noted that defendant/appellant requested no 
instructions to which it was entitled. The requested 
instructions which were denied were improper statements of law, 
The issue of John Doe's intentional conduct was not requested to 
be presented to the Jury, defendant/appellant requested no 
instructions on intent nor any interrogatories on intent. In 
any event, intentional conduct would not have precluded a 
finding of negligence on Classic, if the Jury had found John 
Doe's conduct to have been forseeable and the record amply 
supports such forseeability. 
Defendant/appellant Classic is not entitled to any relief 
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on appeal and the judgment of the Trial Court should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
Jamae G. Clark, for Respondent 
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Gregory J. Sanders, Carman E, Kipp, KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C., 
Attorneys for Appellant Brent Henderson, dba Classic Skating 
Center, 600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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'7/1. M. 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
IVIE k YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 8 North University Avenue 
?• 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN F. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
BRENT HENDERSON, dba 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and 
JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Joan F. Stephens, by and 
through her attorney, Ray Phillips Ivie, and claims as follows: 
1. That defendant is a sole proprietorship, doing 
business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. John Doe is an individual whose identity is 
presently unknown to the plaintiff. However, plaintiff will 
make a timely amendment of her Complaint when the individual's 
idenritv becomes known. 
C O M P L A I N T 
C i v i l No. loo. iod^ch 
COUNT I 
3. That on or about November 3, 1984, plaintiff 
visited the business premises known as Classic Skating Center 
in Orem, Utah County, State of Utah. 
4. That plaintiff's visit was induced by advertise-
ments of ,fFamily Night Skating" and other advertising of the 
defendant, 
5. That plaintiff subsequently paid for admission to 
defendant's premises. 
6. That subsequently, plaintiff was injured when 
struck from behind by defendant John Doe who negligently or 
intentionally caused her to fall to the ground. 
7. That at all times relevant hereto, the defendant 
was negligent in failing to supervise the patrons of their 
establishment, in failing to supervise their employees, and by 
the acts and omissions of their employees in failing to supervise 
defendant's customers. 
8. That as a proximate result of the defendant's 
negligence, real or imputed, the plaintiff suffered a serious 
injury to her arm, and was otherwise injured. 
9. That as a proximate result of the defendant's 
negligence, real or imputed, the plaintiff has sustained 
special damages in the form of medical bills and lost wages, 
which are presently uncertain and ongoing, but for which she 
shall be entitled to recover uccn crcof at trial. 
10. That as a further proximate result of the 
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff has sustained a permanent: 
and debilitating injury, and resulting general damages in an 
amount which she shall be entitled to recover for upon proof at 
trial. 
COUNT II 
11. 3y this reference, plaintiff incorporates all 
other material allegations contained herein. 
12. That defendant John Doe is an individual who 
negligently or intentionally caused plaintiff to fall to the 
ground, thus injuring plaintiff as alleged herein. 
13. That as a proximate result of the negligent or 
intentional acts of John Doe, the plaintiff has sustained 
special damages in the form of medical expenses and lost wages, 
in an amount presently uncertain and ongoing, but for which she 
shall be entitled to recover for upon proof at trial. 
14. That as a further proximate result of defendant 
John Doe's negligence, the plaintiff has sustained a permanent 
and debilitating injury, for which she has been generally 
damaged in an amount that she shall be entitled to recover for 
upon proof at trial. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For special damages to be established upon proof; 
2. For general damages to be established upon proof; 
3. For interest on special damages as provided bv law; 
4. For plaintiff1s costs incurred herein; and, 
5. For such other and further relief as the Couri 
deems iust and orooer in the oremises. 
DATED AND SIGN ED this /y^4^ da y &i^~2pn , 19^5 
// 
Plaintiff f s address: 
785 West 600 North, #22 
Lindon, Utah 84062 
// 
&? / . / " 
%Kq PHIIBIPS IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CARMAN E. KIPP -A1829 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN. PC
 TT „ 
ATTORNEYS FOR B r e n t H e n d e r s o n , d b a , C l a s s i c s k a t i n g C e n t e r 
SOO COMMERCIAL C L U B B U I L D I N G 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
<801) 521-3773 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN F. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT HENDERSON, dba, 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and 
JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Brent Henderson, by and through his attorney 
Carman E. Kipp if the firm of Kipp and Christain, P. C , admits, 
alleges, and denies as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
That plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim 
or claims upon which relief can be granted. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No.: 68,622 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Admits the allegations of paragraph 1. 
2. Denies the allegations of paragraph 2 for lack 
of knowledge. 
COUNT I 
1. Denies all of the allegations of count I of 
plaintiff's complaint for lack of knowledge, and specifically 
denies that this defendant or his employees, agents, or servants, 
were in any way negligent, 
COUNT II 
1. Incorporate the foregoing allegations of this 
answer as though fully set fourth herein. 
2. Denies the remaining allegation of count II for 
lack of knowledge. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
As a separate and affirmative defense this defendant 
alleges that if as a result of some occurence at the place 
of business of defendant, plaintiff suffered some injuries 
and damages, which defendant does not admit, such occurence 
was proximately caused by or contributed to by the negligence 
A-fi 
or fault of plaintiff, and plaintiff is thereby barred from 
recovery, or in the alternative that the degree of plaintiff's 
negligence or fault should be determined and judgment entered 
accordingly. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
As a separate and affirmative defense this defendant 
alleges that if in fact any risk existed at defendant's place 
of business, or if in fact any wrongful conduct or omission 
took place, the defendant knew or should have known of the 
same, acquiesce therein, participated in any such events that 
were involved in the occurence from which this suit arises, 
and by such knowing and intentionally act she is barred from 
recovery or in the alternative that her comparative fault should 
be assessed and judgment entered accordingly. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For Counterclaim defendant alleges that defendant 
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56 1953 as amended, as the action 
is commenced and prosecuted in bad faith or is without merit. 
Wherefore having fully answered plaintiff's complaint, 
P'ST'AN =C 
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defendant prays that the same be dismissed with prejudice, 
that the plaintiff take nothing thereby, and that this defendant 
be granted judgment for no cause of action, and for its costs 
herein expended. 
That judgment be granted on the counterclaim for 
attorney's fees, costs, and for such other and further relief 
as the court deems just and proper. 
Dated this 11th day of March, 1985. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P. C. 
fa, 
Carman E. Kipp ^ /^torney for 
defendant Brer^ T %enderson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim, postage prepaid, 
this 11th day of March, 1985, to the following: 
Rav Phillips Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
^Clr.rn xJk^i /W^ <~\ 
*5 Secretary 
A-8 
Now, we have used a couple of words, or they have, j 
to describe the crowd. One is "rough" and the other is | 
"rowdy.11 And that's really subjective. What's a rowdy | 
j 
crowd? Is a rowdy crowd two kids bomping each other on the j 
! 
floor? Is it 400 people deciding to lynch some patron? j 
You know, what's rowdy? And what's rough? That's subjective;. 
And I suggest to you to a floor guard that's looking at j 
200 to 300 teenage kids out on the floor every night's ! 
! 
rowdy. Okay. And so if you have to understand that, well, \ 
I 
I could get killed for saying this, but one of the reasons I 
I go to work is I've got five kids and I stayed home before, ; 
and I know better than to stay home with five kids. Things 
get pretty rowdy. 
And so this is the atmosphere in which Mrs. 
Stephens puts herself, when she goes in there, she walks ! 
in, she's in there a half-hour before she gets on that 
floor, and she sees the crowd, going around, and she sees 
the nature of the crowd. And I'm not conceding it's rowdy, 
I'm saying it's relative when you talk about rowdy. And she 
see's what's going on, she has ample opportunity. And I 
suggest to you, if she had fear for her safety out there, 
she was negligent to get out onto the floor in that situ-
ation. 
People who roller skarp knnx*? rhar \rr»n ^ a«n f^i 
1 act on her part and I suggest that you can write 50 percent 
2 in there. Is that, if she was perceiving this problem 
3 and exercised poor judgment to get out there into the 
4 problem, that that's at least half responsible. And that 
5 maybe the other half belongs to John Doe. Fifty-fifty. 
6 And zero for Henderson Enterprises. And so you are going to 
7 be asked to do there in percentage-wise, obviously, allocate 
8 the various percentages in negligence that you find to the 
9 various parties. It's extremely important that you under-
10 stand what happens with these percentages. 
11 If you find Mrs. Stephens was 50 percent or more 
12 negligent, she collects nothing. The law is is that if she's 
13 half or more than half at fault for her own injury, she 
14 collects nothing. If you find that she's less than 50 
15 percent negligent and you get, you can divide the percentages 
16 among the other two parties, Henderson or this John Doe, the 
17 problem that we have and as why I'm instructing you on it, 
18 that you need to be sure when you do, if you give Henderson 
19 Enterprises any negligence, that you really want them to pay. 
20 Because the way the law works is called joint and several 
21 liability, and the way the law works is that if Henderson 
22 Enterprises has one percent negligence on this special 
23 verdict form, the plaintiff is allowed to collect the 
24 percent of the judgment from any of the defendants. So what 
25 does that add ut to in this case? You write her cowr. q0 
1 j percent negligence and you write John Doe down 50 percent 
2 ! negligence and give Henderson ten percent negligence, 
3 Henderson will pay a hundred percent of the amount that you 
4 award. Because, nobody knows who John Doe is. And till --
5 ' MR. CLARK: Your Honor, may we approach 
6 l the bench? 
i 
I 
7 j THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
I 
8 ' (Off the record between Counsel and the Court at 
! 
9 i the bench, inaudible.) 
10 MR. CLARK: I think for the kind of 
11 argument encourages the Jury to not comply with the law. 
12 And in addition to that, we can -- to let that go for a 
13 minute, but Mr. Sanders has said that if she is found 40 
14 percent negligent and -- whatever, they would pay it all. 
15 THE COURT: Do you think he did it --
16 MR. CLARK: No, we certainly did not --
17 (Continued off the record, inaudible.) 
18 MR. CLARK: I just wanted to make a 
19 record on it. I object to the joint and several liability 
20 on the ground that it encourages the Jury to discharge --
21 THE COURT: Your objection is noted, and 
22 1 will overrule it. 
23 MR. CLARK: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 MR. SANDERS: Thank you. I can continue, 
25 So the point that vou are makme is. vou need to unaerstand 
1 if you find her less and there's another point that I have to 
J 
2 address on her, too, but I need to get the basic premise j 
3 out here for you that Henderson Industries, if you give them \ 
4 one — is going to pay a hundred percent of this judgment. 
5 And the final point of how this whole system works,1 
6 and I hope I didn't lose you on this, I try not to talk too , 
7 much, legally, but is that the percentage which you gave to 
8 Mrs. Stephens will be applied to the judgment that's ultimate-
9 ly paid. So to put it in the context, if you award her $1,000 
10 and you find her 40 percent negligent and John Doe 50 per-
il cent negligent and Henderson ten percent, she'll receive 
12 $600 and Henderson will pay it all. Okay. The problem with 
13 this kind of situation is, is you are not allowed to ask 
14 questions and go back and forth. And so I apologize for that, 
15 But the one thing I want you to understand is, you don't 
16 find Mrs. Stephens 50 percent or more negligent and you give 
17 one percent to the Hendersons. You need to be sure that you 
18 want to pay a hundred percent of the negligence, because 
19 that's what's going to happen -- her negligence. 
20 To sum this up then is, chat it's our position 
21 that Henderson Enterprises takes some very definite steos, 
22 as they've explained tc you, to insure the or tc protect the 
23 sarety of their patrons. Everything was in place that nisht. 
24 We can't make a response to a particular moment of the 
25 accident, because nobody on this side of the aisle knows 
CLASSIC SKATING 
JOB DESCRIPTION - FLOOR GUARD 
I EXHIBIT 
I NO. V 
You are the example of how others should skate. Never violate any rule at 
any time for any reason. Know all of the floor rules and enforce them politely. 
When there is a violation of a floor rule follow these steps: 
First violation of floor rules 
1. Inform skater of what he is doing wrong. 
2. Inform skater of all the floor rules in general such 
as no rough skating, tag, fast skating that would be 
dangerous to others, etc. 
3. Inform skater that next time he violates a rule, he 
will be taken and reported to the manager. 
Second violation of floor rules 
1. Minor infraction—of very different nature from the 
first warning. Repeat first step of first violation. 
2. Major infraction—take person to manager. This is 
done by telling the person that the manager would like 
to speak to him. Inform the manager of the violation 
which is the 2nd offense. 
Depending upon the violation the person will either be warned that upon 
another violation he will remove his skates and leave (unless he is too 
young and must wait for his parents to pick him up) or he will be put in 
the penalty box for a 15-60 minute period depending on the violation. 
Avoid skating backwards. The bigger the crowd the more strictly you must 
enforce the rules. 
When a person is hurt: 
» 1 • m 1 1 • 
1. Do not move him until: 
a. He says he is all right and can get up by his own strength. 
b. If he can't get up on his own: 
l) Find out what hurts. 
If a person cannot move: 
a) Get a responsible person (parent, chaperone, friend) 
b) Call an ambulance if manager thinks this is necessary. 
You are not a doctor so you know absolutely nothing. 
3) Let someone else be responsible for moving him. Not you! 
*0 If no one will take the responsibility send someone to 
get the manager. 
2. Always stand in front of the person so no one will run into him. 
3. Always try to make the person as comfortable as possible. 
If you become tired or need a rest you can sit where you can watch tne floor 
and wnere they can see you. 
Controlling angry people 
Don't get mad at them. Always be very calm. Inform them that anyone caught 
fighting is kicked out forever. Don't talk about any fight in or out of the 
rink. If a fight hairoens hlnw vmi- «>***••• i~ t~,^ -i~ -»-• 
a) 
JOB DESCRIPTION - FLOOR GUARD 
Page 2 
if two people might get into one. Watch for a tripper or problem causer. 
No second chances are given here. Talk to the individual to see if they 
have a problem with another skater. 
Always pick up any paper or things on skating floor. Wipe up any liquid. 
Return toe stops to skate counter. Always listen and look for broken skates, 
bearings, toe stops, trucks etc. 
Don't get involved talking to someone while on the job. Pay attention to 
what is going on! 
When not skating, such as during special skates (couples, boys or girls only 
etc.) pick up all garbage in the lobby and snack bar and return rental 
skates to skate counter. Check the restroom for garbage, smokers, etc. 
This should be done at the start of each special skate. At other times 
always keep watch on the skating floor. 
Floor Guards do not skate couples, trios, etc. except by permission each time. 
General Rules 
No one can sit on the floor at any time or any where. 
Fast skating (passing more people than are passing himself)is not allowed. 
No cutting in and out of people. 
No whips. 
No trains of more than 3 people. 
No tag or what is similar to chasing, follow the leader etc. 
No sitting on the walls or sides. 
No throwing of anything. 
Inform parents that carrying of children is dangerous and we are not res-
ponsible for what might happen. 
No hats, food, candy, rat tail combs, or anything that might be dangerous. 
No tripping, pushing, pulling. 
No jumping on rental skates. 
No jumping anything or any one. 
No pushing shoot the duck or shoot the duck alone (only in the middle of 
the skating floor.) 
No public display of affection. 
No whistling, 
No skates with metal wheels or skates which have been used outside. 
No smoking anywhere. 
No kicking game machines. 
No throwing of food, drinks or ice. 
Nc foul language. 
List of responsibilities during a session 
ng the first JZ minutes 
Help skate boys hand out skates. 
Watch floor carefully. The first ones out are usually 
the ones wnc violate tne floor rules. 
Direct people to locker area. 
Check skating floor for trash or other dangerous items. 
A-14 
JOE DESCRIPTION - FLOOR GUARD 
Page 3 
During All Skates 
1. Watch for people that have fallen or have been hurt. 
2. Enforce All rules, on and off of skating floor. 
3. Pick up trash on floor. 
4. Listen for broken skates. 
During Special Skates (such as Couples, Trios, etc.) 
1. Check Restrooms. Pick trash up and flush all toilets. 
2. Check Snack Bar. Pick trash off floor. 
3. Check Locker Area. Lovers, smokers, trash, etc. 
4. Check Kiddie Korner. Big kids. 
5. Check Gaines. Working right and no abuse. 
End of a Session 
1. If there is only one floor guard, ask manager what you should do. 
2. If there are two or more, the first must watch the floor, second 
help with putting away skates, by tucking in laces, putting away 
skates or telling people to bring skates to counter. 
3. The last couples skate you are not allowed to skate with a part-
ner. Please don't ask. 
Your first responsibility is the skating floor and the safety of everyone 
on it. Never stop watching the floor. Helping hurt people and enforcing 
the rules is your most important responsibility! 
If there is mone than one floorquard working, keep each other informed of problem 
sKaters,but always stay as far away as possible from each other so that you 
are watching a different part of the floor. 
ROLLER SKATING RINK 
SAFETY STANDARDS 
The following operational standards for rinks were compiled by the RSROA Risk Management 
Committee and adopted February 7,1980, and amended May 2, 1981. as an industry standard by vote 
of the RSROA Board. 
!. Safety Standards for Roller Skating Floor Supervisors 
A. There will be floorguards on duty whenever the rink is open for sessions. 
B. One floorguard shall be on duty for approximately every 200 skaters. 
C. Floorguards must be identifiable by their attire. 
D. The floorguard's duty is to direct and supervise skaters. 
1. The conduct of skaters will be under floorguard's supervision. 
2. When working alone, floorguards will not skate special events with a partner. He or she 
must be available to assist skaters at all times. Relief of floorguard will be provided by 
management. 
3. When two floorguards are working, one must be available to assist skaters and supervise 
the floor. 
4. Additional skating supervision may be provided by personnel observing the premises on or 
off skates. 
5. Watch for foreign objects of all kinds that may have fallen on the floor. 
6. Watch skates for bad stops, nails or other protrusions. 
7. When a skater falls, if it is necessary, assist the skater off the floor via the nearest exit. If 
possibility of serious injury exists, CALL MANAGER FOR ASSISTANCE. 
8. A floorguard must use good judgement while being firm and maintaining the respect of 
the skaters. 
9. Although floorguards must be informative and courteous, conversations must be l imited. 
If a patron needs to be reprimanded more than once, he or she should be brought to the 
Manager for final disposition. 
II. Safety Standards for Building 
1. Skating surface shall be inspected before each session and kept clean. 
2. Railing, kickboards and wall surrounding skating surface shall be kept in good condit ion. 
3. in rinks with step-up or step-down skating surfaces, the covering on the riser shall be 
securely fastened. 
4 Emergency lighting units should be inspected periodically to insure that they are in proper 
operating condition. 
5. Exit lights and lights in service areas shall remain on when skating surface lights are 
turned off during special numbers 
6. Fire extinguishers should be inspected at recommended intervals. 
7. If a burglar alarm system is installed, it should be checked for operation at least once a 
month. 
8 Conduct in parking areas shall be regulated by rink personnel. 
9 When required by applicable law, emergency lighting shall be installed in conformity with 
that law 
10 When required by applicable law all fire exits shall have panic hardware installed which 
sha^ be in good operating condit ion, m conformity with that taw 
III. Safety Standards for Roller Skating Equipment 
1 Skate renta's should De checkeo on a regula r basis ior gooa mechanics1 condition 
IV. General 
1. For safety. »ntcxicat:.ig be-.e-ages sna!i not be sold dispensed o r kncw«ng«y used in rink 
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